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INTRODUCTION 
Eugene E .  Drucker 
I would l ike to s t a r t  t h i s  presentation with a few words concerning our 
or igin,  makeup and objectives, Our program was conceived as a resu l t  of 
NASA's desire to make i t s e l f  available to  the Universities as a learning 
laboratory. The Syracuse University e f fo r t  was begun under the Sustaining 
University Program as the f i r s t  part  of a planned long range association 
between Syracuse and NASA. The purpose of our particular study was partly to  
update the University in the methods of modern project management, and partly 
to  study NASA from a more objective, broader point of view and with greater 
ar t iculat ion than might be possible within NASA i t s e l f .  
The complexity of NASA's total  task required us to  concentrate on a 
small piece-of the whole picture,  which, by mutual in t e re s t ,  focused in on 
the role of the project manager in the Apollo Program. We are talking about 
managers of projects l ike  LM, CSM, S-I-C, S-11, S-IVB, e t c .  
For about 2 years we have been studying the anatomy of project management 
in Apollo, and we have found that  the study of the project manager, the person, 
i s  inextricably entangled in the study of project management as an organiza- 
t ion ,  
The makeup of our research team was guided by the requirements of the 
task, and the team i s  now a close knit group from engineering, business 
administration, sociology and pol i t ical  science. We have learned t o  work 
together extraordinarily we1 1 as an interdisciplinary team. 
Our information was gathered from a large number of lengthy interviews 
mostly taped, with NASA personnel a t  several levels a t  the three major f i e ld  
centers and headquarters, with engineers and managers a t  the plants of f ive  
prime contractors, with NASA resident people, and with Congressmen and 
Congressional committee s t a f f s ,  Also, NASA documents, contractor documents 
and Congressional committee reports were used. Finally, we held a 3 day 
conference with our own project team and representative NASA personnel to  
t e s t  some of our preliminary hypotheses and conclusions. 
From these sources we have formed-a comprehensive picture of the various 
interactions of a project manager with the elements of his working environment, 
We would l ike to proceed with a ser ies  of very compact summaries of our 
research findings, with the hope that  you can suggest places in NASA where 
our type of work could f i t  in ,  
We'll s t a r t  w j  t h  our sociologist ,  Bill Pooler. 
APOLLO AND GENERAL-ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
W i l l i a m  Pooler  
The aim o f  t h i s  p resenta t ion  i s  t o  d iscuss some o f  the  p o t e n t i a l  
general o rgan i za t i ona l  p rope r t i es  o f  t h e  Apo l lo  p r o j e c t  e f f o r t .  An 
i m p l i c i t  assumption i s  t h a t  an i n t e n s i v e  s tudy o f  t he  matura t ion  o f  the  
NASA - Apo l l o  o rgan i za t i on  can s u b s t a n t i a l l y  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t he  extension 
and modi f i c a t i o n  o f  c u r r e n t  o rgan i za t i on  and management theory.  
The Apo l l o  p r o j e c t  dominated the  hos t  o rgan iza t ion ,  NASA, which 
housed i t .  Men and d o l l a r  resources tended t o  f l o w  t o  NASA through and 
because o f  Apo l lo .  Over t ime as f e r v o r  dimmed and resources became 
scarcer,  t he  b ind ing  o f  Apo l lo  t o  the  r e s t  o f  NASA and the  a t tendant  
readjustment became problemat ic .  No doubt t h e  quasi-autonomy and h igh  
p r i o r i t y  Apo l l o  e n ~ o y e d  c o n t r i b u t e d  l a r g e l y  t o  the success o f  t h e  venture, 
But s ince  i t  was a  p r o j e c t  w i t h  a  p r e c i s e l y  de f ined  goal,  t he  f u t u r e  o f  
the t o t a l  o rgan iza t ion ,  was threatened once the  task  was completed. Future 
under tak ings w i l l  have t o  be organized such t h a t  o rgan i za t i on  and p r o j e c t  
concerns, as w e l l  as t h e i r  i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s  a re  balanced. Somehow p r o j e c t s  
must be dominated by t h e  more enduring hos t  o rgan iza t ion ,  no mat te r  what 
t h e i r  s i z e  o r  scope. A t  the  same time, because o f  t he  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  
i nvo l ved  i n  Research and Development work and the  l i f e - c y c l e  na tu re  o f  
p ro jec t s ,  o rgan i za t i ona l  f l e x i b i l i t y  and r e c e p t i v i t y  t o  change must be 
ma-intained. 
I n  complex t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  o r i e n t e d  organ iza t ions ,  there  a re  th ree  
general dimensions which must be coord inated and made harmonlous, They 
are;  t he  techn i ca l  and/or s c i e n t i f i c  , the  o v e r a l l  i n t e r n a l  o rgan i za t i on  , 
and the soc ia l ,  economic, and pol i t ical  environment. I do not think i t  
i s  accidental that  the Apollo project proceeded relat ively smoothly when 
the top leadership of NASA consisted of the t r iad  of Webb looking outward, 
Seamens acting as a general 'manager, and Dryden over-seeing the sc i en t i f i c  
and technical conslderations, No doubt functional equivalents to  th is  
kind of leadership e x i s t ,  One al ternat ive would be the creation of the 
Office of Organization and Management coupled with similar emphases on 
coordinating sc i en t i f i c  and technical expertise and extra-NASA organiza- 
tional relationships,  Whatever the arrangement, these three dimensions 
appear to require constant monitoring for  the continued functioning of 
complex organizations, 
The strong in-house technical and sc ien t i f ic  capabili ty o f  NASA 
contributed to  the success of Apollo, B u t  as the character of the program 
changed, and as design and development decisions were made which acted t o  
constrai n the future di rection of the program, coordination and organizational 
control concerns assumed greater .  importance, Thus, managerial competence 
also.p%ayed an important par t - in  the Apollo success, And f ina l ly ,  as national 
pr ior i t ies  changed, the s k i l l  of Webb and others in dealing with the 
Executive and the Congress and in restructuring NASA and Apollo such that  i t  
could.adapt to  diminished resources was also important, 
Current models of organization are too s t a t i c .  NASA and the Apollo 
program have changed drastical ly since the i r  inception, We have to create 
new models which capture the change processes as we71 as the important 
enduring structural considerations, 
Parenthetically, 1 might make some additional remarks, A knowledge 
of past history,  for  example, the t i e  between Houston a n d  the older NACA 
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was o f  a  w ider  scope, such as competing ss lh taons  t o  a problem which a f f e c t e d  
a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  t o t a l  p r o j e c t ,  ~t wou i d  be c a r r i e d  t o  h i ghe r  
l e v e l s  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  where r e s p o n s i b i l ~ t y  and scope o t  e o n t l i c e  were 
b e t t e r  matched, 
The second c h a r a c t e ~ i s t i c  i n ~ o l v e s  t he  na tu re  s f  t h e  upward f l o w  o f  
c o n f l i c t s  coupled w i t h  t h e  necess i t y  o f  in formataon feedback, The change 
panels,  w h i l e  o s t e n s i b l y  c rea ted  as a conf7gusataon management dev ice  
can a l s o  be conceptua l i zed  as a general  o r g a n a z a t ~ o n a l  mechanism f o r  
necessary h i e r a r c h i c a l  e v a l u a t i o n  and c o n t r o l ,  Th i s  i s  t m e  especsa l l y  
w i t h i n  o rgan i za t i ons  which comprise a s e r i e s  o f  f e l a t i u e  ly  i n s u l a t e d  l e v e l s  
and w i t h i n  these l e v e l s  a s e r i e s  o f  r e l d e i v e l y  i n s u l a t e d  s ~ b - u n j t s ,  As 
problems a r i s e  t h a ~  cannot be sa lved  by t he  sub-unles,  a  s ~ n g i e  l e v e l  
change panel i s  i n i t i a t e d ,  E i t h e r  t he  problem i s  so lved  o r  i c s  dimensions 
a re  brought  i n t o  c l e a r e r  focus,  I f  i t  cannot be handled a t  t h i s  l e v e l ,  
members o f  t h e  sub-un i ts ,  now rep resen t i ng  t h e  wavieey o f  i n t e r e s t s  a t  
a  particular l e v e l  i n r t i a t e  a  change panel a t  t h e  n e x t  h ~ g h e s t  l e v e l ,  As 
t he  problem goes t o  t h e  n e x t  h i ghe r  l e v e l  o f  t h e  avgan i zd t f sn  t he  views 
and i n t e r e s t s  o f  t he  sub-un i ts  o f  t he  lowet  levels o f  ehe organszalaon a r e  
represented and as w e l l  g rea te r  d e f s n i t i o n  o f  t he  problem 1s achieved 
Each c o n f l j c t  o r  problem represen ts  a s u b s t a n t ~ v e  anstance s f  ehe change 
panel system i n  o p e r a t ~ o n ,  w i t h  t he  formal  s t r u c t u r e  enduwsng as a 
mechanism t o  i n s u r e  feedback and c o n t 7 i e t  r e s e l ~ t ? s n ~  An ~ m p o r t a n t  
aspect  o f  t h i s  process i s  t h e  assurnpt~on t h a t  many pvoblems a re  f o u t j n e  
and can be handled a t  lower  l e v e l s  o f  t he  srgan~zatlon To encourage 
necessary upward i n f o r m a t i o n  f l ows ,  problem fesokutasn proceeds =Inductively 
w ~ t h  t he  i n t e r e s t s  and perspecta ~ e s  o f  concerned members o t  a17 l e v e l s  s f  
t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  be ing  vo-iced i n  2, dete rn i ina t fsn  o f  a problem s o l u t i o n ,  
A  s tudy  o f  NASA a l s o  makes c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  chadacteu of  s p e c i t l c  tasks  
and e a r l y  i n t r a - o r g a n ~ z a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  necessary Pov bn hdequate 
understandang o f  complex o u g a n l z a t ~ o n ,  The t h r e e  field cente rs  o f  t h e  
Apo l l o  e f f o r t  ape q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t l y  s r g a n ~ z e d ,  To u n d e ~ s t a n d  how and why 
they  a re  d i f f e r e n t  i t  i s  necessary t o  analyze specific r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
w j t h i n  each o f  t h e  cen te rs ,  For example, some o f  t he  d i f f e r e n c e s  between 
t he  f i e l d  cen te rs  can be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  we77 developed u e l a t i o n s h j p s  
between m iss ion  c o n t r o l  , t h e  as t ronau ts ,  t h e  sc;lenl;ists, and t h e  engi  neers 
a t  Houston i n  comparison t o  t h e  very  c l ose  h i s t o f ~ c a l  ties betheen t he  
l a b o r a t o r y  d i r e c t o r s  and t h e  t o p  A p o ~ l o  and f ~ e l d  c e n t e t  I e a d e r s h ~ p  a t  
H u n t s w i l l  e, Other d i f f e r e n c e s  r e l a t e  t o  t h e  development o f  p a r t 7 c u l a r i s t i c  
i n t e r - f i e l d  centev r e l a t i o n s h i p s  such as those between Kennedy and t he  
o t h e r  two cen te rs  as a consequence s f  t he  con f i gus fng  and launch ing  respon- 
s i b i l i t i e s  l o c a t e d  a t  Kennedy, F i n a l  dy, t he  very na tu re  s f  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  
f u r t h e r  accounts For  t h e  d ~ f f e ~ e n c e s  w i t hsn  t he  cen te rs  and thes f  d ~ t f e r e n t  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and p r o j e c t  o ~ g a n i z a t i o n s ,  An ~ n t e r e s t i n g  t h e s r e t ~ c a i  
problem has t o  do w i t h  sepa ra t i ng  out, gener ic  fcsm s i t u o c i u n a l l y  s p e c f f i c  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  cons ideua t ions ,  And i t  can o n l y  be fesorved by l ong  term 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  activities 07 complex o u y ~ n a z a t i o n s  such as 
NASA, 
Th i s  d i scuss ion  suggests t h a t  what has been aceomplashed by NASA has 
i m p l l e a t i o n s  f o r  gener ic  o r g a n i z a t ~ o n  and management theory I would a l s o  
l i k e  t o  suggest t h a t  t h e  NASA-ApolYo model can be u t i 2 ; r e d  as a guide f o r  
f u t u r e  i n t e r - d i s c i p l i n a r y  tasks  whethes they  be o f  a technacau o f  soc-ial 
na tu re ,  E s s e n t i a l l y ,  ApoS?o i nvo l ved  managrny and c s o c d a n a t t n g  d i v e r s e  
groups and tasks w a t h a n  and outsade the ofganaz~tion,  T ~ I S  was accomplished 
by a core sf  highly competent technic3 1 and mandgemene per ssnnel who control - 
led resources and who formulated d n  overall dessgn zhat was modified and 
extended through time, There i s  every expectatson khae samilar cove 
organizations can be c ~ e a t e d  t o  work  on new probiems facing NASA as well as 
existing problems of human society such as pupbldtasn, hodsing and p u b l ~ c  
transportation, 
The strength and feassbi1it.y of the model l i e s  ~n cveat~ng d strong 
in-house technical and manageraal capabr  l r t y  t o  almenslon, desa y n ,  d n d  
control the overall e f fo r t  and as we17 to "manage" d ~ t e r s e  gvoups in a 
re lat ively insular fashion, The inter-discipl inafy focus  i s  ach~eved not 
by bringing a l l  the relevant d i scap l~ne  personnel together 10  cine oyganaza- 
t ion,  b u t  rather by le t t ing  each of the d i sc~p lane  g f m p 5  wofk on their  
aspect of the e f for t  with d i r e c t ~ o n  from the s m ~ l l e r  L o p e  o tgan~zat i sn  
comprised of experts from a l l  the discipl lnes .  This c o r e  group wsd%d have 
the responsibil i ty f o r  evalwak7ng and  b r i n g i n g  togethey the sueput $ram 
the separate ast ivi  t i e s  they were managing, In essence, th i s  appears t o  
represent an infovmed -inteudiseip7inais pefspec t r~e  csupted w s t h  6 research 
and development orientat7 on neeessdvy t o  dea k w-'ch rhe esnrp e ex hixrnan problems 
that face man, In s p ~ r i t  i t  is the model aevehoped o b t  s i  the NASA-Apolls 
experience , 
THE ROLE AND PROBLEMS OF THE PR03ECT MANAGER 
- 
David L W~Semon 
My o b j e c t i v e  i n  t h e  r esea f ch  progrdm has been t o  -invest;gdte t h e  i n t e r -  
personal  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  e x i s t i n g  w l t h l n  t h e  Apsr i o  p r o j e c t  gkowps Mote 
spec? f i e a l  l y ,  I have been i n v e s t r  g a t i  ng hew p r o j e c t  managers ~ n f  luence t h e  
t e c h n i c a l  spec l ' a l i s t s  ove r  whom they have na c i i -~rect  a u t h o r i t y ,  b u t  fin whom 
they  a r e  dependent Sou ~ n f o r m a t i o n  and s ~ , p p o v t ,  I n  o the r  w o ~ d s ,  what 
l e v e r s  can a  p r o j e c t  manages* "pu1 1 " t o  u.cco~r~pi a s h  t h e  cos t t ,  ~ ~ h e d ~ ~ d e ,  an  
performance, o b j e c t ~ v e s  o f  h i s  p ~ o g e c t ?  I n  d = i s c d ; s ~ n g  xhe l a c k  sP a u t h o r i t y  
ove r  suppo r t  personnel  , one Apol l e P ,  M [ p r e ~ e c t  mantiger 1 noted : 
I t h i n k  i t  makes a t  mote a s f f s c b f ~  t o  g e t  the  j o b  
done when you have t o  se l y  cn suppor t  grupie oved 
whom you have no real a u t h o r ,  t y  
To q d e n t i f y  how P,MOts  gee suppour. rsf the p r o j e ~ t s  w ~ t h o u t  tormh? 
a u t h o r i t y  I s h a l l  ana lyze  some o f  ehe iirt tuence technaqcdei employed by 
A p o l l o  p rogec t  managers- These r n f l u e n c e  techniques a i e  mosr appatent a n d  
most e a s i l y  understood when we v iew  the p r o j e c t  rnbnager s r e l a t i o n s h T p  w i t h  
those -in t h e  research  and development l a b o i t i t o f a e s  and those w i t h l n  t h e  
v a ~ i o u s  f u n c t % o n a l  areas s f  NASA These r n f i bence  bv power techn-~ques a t e  
a l s o  used I n  t h e  p r o j e c t  manager" seaatsonshaps w ~ r h  h 4 5  con t rac to r  
However, i n  t h i s  ease he a d d i t i o n a l l y  has t ~ n a n c i a l  l everage  v i a  t h e  c o n t r a c t .  
We found t h a t .  9 2nd r e f e r e n t  
a r e  t h e  t h r e e  pr%mary ~ r r - f ~ u e n ~ e  t e s h n a q ~ ~ e s  used by p r o j e c t  rncinagers, 
Expe r t  power, f o r  exarrrpke, r e f e r s  t o  t h e  a b ?  i I t y  e f  t h e  p r o j e c t  ma7tdgefl t o  
g e t  h i s  i n t e r f a c e s  t o  do what he wants  chem t o  do bec;use they atev i b u t e  
I /  = g r e a t e r  knowledge t o  h im o 7  b e i l e v e  hcr L S  muie q u o  A b i 7 e d "  t o  eva  ruu ' t e  The 
consequences o f  certain progecc acryons than they dr e Ezpest pades can come 
f rom a  p r o j e c t  manager" smanager2ai e x p e r t i s e  s f  tiam h r s  eechnscal competepee 
I n  t h e  aPea o f  managerial  exper tase the  p t s j e ~ t  nlafragec mdy habe d b r l  a" t ?es  
assoc ia ted  w i t h  t h e  management o f  the p r o j e c t  w h ~ ~ h  enables hjrn xs b u i l d  an  
i n f l u e n c e  base over  o t h e ~ s ~  F ~ Y -  example, the p r o j e c t  mdnager 1 %  I n  a 
c r 1 t i c a I  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  can a l l o w  him %O h d ~ e  d s j s t e m r t  brew o f  me t o t a l  
a c t f v i t i e s  o f  t h e  puo,ject, He knows what i n p u t s  dndicc changes w l l  1 a r f e c t  
t h e  bus iness s i d e  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t ,  H;is managernessx c b ~  l i t j e ~  a s e  f ~ e q u e n t l y  
demonstrated by h i s  grasp o f  the csmpl r c a t e d  ces t , ;c h e d u l  e , a n d  I nlsvmati on 
systems a t t ached  t o  t h e  pvo,ject o r g a n l z a t ~ o n  d s  ~ e i ?  as h ~ s  human t e l a t i o n s  
s k i S I s ,  
I n  some cases ~t appears  t h a t  ~t 7s d i i t ' ~ G i  ~ L I  the  pra jec r ,  ntdnager t o  
e x e r t  i n f l u e n e e  based on t e c h n l c a i  absP I t j  d bone However, t h i s  m ~ y  be ovev- 
come i f  t h e  p r o j e c t  manager can v iew t h e  pao j ec t  t rom a ~ , r x e d  teehniea7i /  
managerfa1 pe rspec t f ve ,  I %  may a i; so be o~eicome by h i s  deti lonstfated d b ;  1 i t i i e s  
and t sack - reco rd  i n  making sobnd p r o ~ e s t  decasisns 
The a b i l i t y  t o  reward and  p d n l s h  d i f e c t  0 6  ; nc f - cece lJ~  - 5  another means 
by which p r o j e c t  managers b u i l d  an rnfluence hose A!ths~yh 2 t  appears 
t h a t  t h e  p r o j e c t  managers w i t h i n  t h e  Apslla prograin ~ a n i l o t  use f e w a i d  power 
as f r e e l y  as thea"r coun te rpa r t s  ? n  ~ n d u s t r j ,  i n  maEtt;ers such as pf@modions 
and s a l a r y  inc reases ,  t hey  can sewaid p r o j e c t  partrcjpanti by :  
9 , Giv ing  uecsgnS t i o n - - b o t h  torma i l y  and I r~fosrnk; l y  
2 ,  P r o v i d i n g  g r e a t e r  t 7 ~ l b ~ B r t y  
3 ,  Givsng st~mulatang woik assrgnnlents 
4, Delegate a u t h o c ~ t j  d n d  a e s p a n s ~ b ~ ; l l y  t o  h ~ s  : n te f r aees ,  
Project managers can "punrsh" those hho do nct peifosfm ddequdte?) by: 
1 ,  Isolatang them from t h e  prlrnaiy a ~ t ~ o n  f  t h e  project,  
2 -  Giving negative comments t o  t h e  ~ n d d u 9 d ~ a ~ ' 5  super do^? 
3 ,  By formal means, I e , dccunient~t'krilg the ~ndlud~dual 's  
lack of eompl i anee  
4, Exposlng mistdkes o t  t h e ~ r  ~ n l e r t d t e s  t o  t h e l f  peer* g ~ o b p s ,  
The 1 a s t  type of anFT uenee we f o u n d  h e ~ n g  used 1 s aePer enc powet , I r  3 %  
based on the deg~ee  t o  whsch the pwogect manager 's  r~terf6:es 1 )  rdenirfy 
with and are eommi tted t o  the obgec t7 ves  c f  the  p r o j e c t ;  3 )  idem i f y  wa t h  the 
organizational position o f  the p ro jec t  rnanagef ; d n d  31 sdentlry and v a  c u e  
the i r  relationship w i t h  the project mdnager as an s n d  vrdbol, 
One project managep expla~ned xhc v a i b e  o f  referent powet t h r  s way- 
I  think T, have the conildenme o r  msp suppo t% people I ' m  
able to call  them and get d ve ry  q i i j c k  sespanie wr thou t  
a n y q u e s t ~ s n  E t h i n k i t 3 s m u t u a a  eonl;dente t h a t I L n l  
able t o  get them t o  ~espand 7 Ldn  p 7 c ~  up r h e  phone and 
call  any fellow r n  the sopport. g fcup a n d  tee1 them &e ve  
got a problem a t  the Cape and  y o o ' v e  g o t  t o  ca t ch  6 prane 
He doesn't work f o s  me, he dsesn? owe erne a r ~ ~ s h - n g  b u t  
he ' l l  do ;it ., 
A proJ"ect manager a l s o  has t h e  [ , f i t ~ n ~ ; a ?  T O ;  ~ ~ ~ i I ~ e n L 1 ~ ~  ~ J S  slnppovt people 
9 ' f  they can identify wreh h l ~ r r ,  or l gnd  C; scrmrncsi'i bc;s i3 t o t  xeSp(i~tgir<j b ~ m ,  AS 
one manager s ta ted ,  "There's a  phalosophy hefe t h a t  you a r e n k  a good  project 
manager unless you 'be come up th fough  The bowe r s o f  enga neera ng - . , Another 
P,M, agreed with h ~ s  obsevvat7ons and p u r  r t  t h  s w d j :  
1 guess 1% so! t o f  S U L ~ Y  l i i  .%hat 1 ian ie  w i t h  the 
support people so they don" r esen t  me. 1 have no 
trouble in getting a l o n g  W )  t h  them lt" bbet~fi 
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  o t h e r  managers who haven ' t  come up 
through t he  ranks migh t  have had more d i f f i c u l t y  than 
I ' v e  had. ,. 
Another P.M., when asked how he knew who t o  ask f o r  adv ice  when he needed 
suppor t  rep1 i e d  : " S t r i c t l y  personal f r i e n d s  t h a t  you 've c u l  t i v a t e d  over  
t he  years  .., and they  may be anywhere w i t h i n  NASA." 
What i s  t he  b e s t  " i n f l u e n c e  mix "  f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t  manager t o  employ? 
1.  I f  he has t o o  much t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t i s e  i t  thwar t s  
t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  h i s  suppo r t i ng  team members. F u l l  
commi t tmen t  by them i s  weakened because i t  des t roys  
t h e i r  i n t r i n s i c  mo t i va t i ons  i n  prob lem-solv ing.  
2 .  I f  he has t o o  l i t t l e  t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t i s e  i t  slows 
down t h e  decis ion-making process o f  t he  p r o j e c t .  The 
P.M, would f r e q u e n t l y  need t o  check on t h e  adv ice  he 
rece i ves  from h i s  suppor t  people,  I n  t he  process, he 
m igh t  l o s e  c o n t r o l  over  h i s  p r o j e c t .  
3. I f  the  P,M, has t oo  much r e f e r e n t  power h i s  suppor t  
personnel may be a f r a i d  t o  t e l l  h im h e ' s  wrong. They 
may f o l l o w  him b l i n d l y  and n o t  c a l l  a  spade a  spade. 
4. I f  the  P,M. has t oo  much reward power, i t  may weaken 
t he  s t r eng ths  i n h e r e n t  i n  NASA's s k i l l  cen te r s ,  Good 
suppor t  people may want t o  g r a v i t a t e  t o  p r o j e c t  work r a t h e r  
than b u i l d  e x p e r t i s e  i n  a  f u n c t i o n a l  work area. I t  may 
cause a  "cheese-gap" o r  reward gap w i t h  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
o rgan i za t i on .  Support  personnel may be a f r a i d  t o  i n d u l g e  
i n  independent p rob lem-so lv ing  i f  the  P,M. has t oo  much 
reward and punishment power. 
We conclude t h a t  t he  most e f f e c t i v e  s t y l e  f o r  p r o j e c t  managers appears 
t o  be one based on e x p e r t  and r e f e r e n t  power r a t h e r  than one based on t h e  
P . M . ' S  reward and punishment power o r  t h e  use s f  h i s  l i m i t e d  degrees o f  
authority. The expertlreferent s ty le  seems best t o  promote independent, 
professionally oriented problem-solving. I t  i s  a model where the par t ic i -  
pants respond to "colleague authority" rather than formal authority. 
Speci a1 Problems Faced by Project Managers 
Moving away from the influence techniques used by project managers, I 
would l ike  to discuss some of the problems faced by project managers. They 
are: 
1 ,  Balancing his technical and managerial project 
functions. 
2 .  Coping with Project and Professional Risk. 
3. Surviving Organizational Restraints. 
4 .  Managing Human Re1 a t i  ons hi ps . 
5 .  Evaluating Information from Project team members. 
A potential problem for  the P,M, l i e s  in over-stressing e i ther  his technical 
or his managerial responsi bi 1 i t i e s  to  the project. One supporting project 
team member emphasized the problem of an imbalance in the project manager's 
technical and manageri a1 ski 11 s as Pol I ows : 
I 've had experiences where the project manager t r ied  to 
be too technical . , .  t h a t ' s  what his project team i s  f o r . . .  
Two types of r isks  P.M.'S face--project r isk ( fa i lure  of his project)  
and professional r isk (engineering obsolescence) . 
Differences in the perception of project r isk may be i l lus t ra ted  by 
these two responses from P.M. ' s .  
If my hardware d idn ' t  work and failed i t  would be a 
catastrophic occurrence, P would completely expect 
to  be rep1 aced,, , , 
By c o n t r a s t ,  another  P.M, sa id :  
I f  you d i d n  ' t  want t o  accept  t h e  respons i  b i  1  i ty  f o r  t h e  
p r o j e c t ,  you d o n ' t  have t o ,  you j u s t  buck i t  up t o  t h e  
n e x t  manager, and i f  he d o e s n ' t  want t o  make t h e  d e c i s i o n  
he can buck i t  up t o  t h e  program manager. 
Engineer ing obsolescence, by c o n t r a s t ,  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
l o s i n g  one 's  t e c h n i c a l  competence as t he  r e s u l t  o f  concen t ra t i on  on manage- 
ment d u t i e s .  One P,M. emphasized t he  p o i n t  by s t a t i n g :  
When my p r o j e c t  te rmina tes ,  1 '11  be an obso le te  engineer  ... 
an u n t r a i n e d  manager, and t oo  o l d  t o  go back t o  school .  
It i s  impo r tan t  t o  p o i n t  o u t ,  however, t h a t  f o r  some P.M.'S p r o f e s s i o n a l  
r i s k  i s  a  t r a d e - o f f .  P r o j e c t  manager A, f o r  example, may want t o  make h i s  
career  i n  t he  management s i d e  and he sees t h a t  p r o j e c t  management i s  a  
v e h i c l e  t h a t  can h e l p  him achieve h i s  p ro fess iona l  a s p i r a t i o n s ,  
A  number o f  t h e  P.M,s i n te r v i ewed  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  c e r t a i n  parameters 
and r e s t r a i n t s  a re  p laced  on them over  t h e  l i f e  c y c l e  o f  t h e i r  p r o j e c t s .  As 
p r o j e c t s  mature va r i ous  management r e p o r t i n g  systems become a t tached t o  t h e  
p r o j e c t s  and remain, As one P.M. noted:  
As a  P,M. you g e t  h i t  w i t h  d i r e c t i v e s ,  Prom t h e  t o p  and 
f rom every  l e v e l ,  Many o f  these d i r e c t i v e s  r e q u i r e  
comprehensive r e p o r t i n g .  We've g o t  a l o t  o f  people who 
t h i n k  i t  would be r e a l  n i c e  t o  have t h i s  o r  t h a t  r e p o r t .  
C i v i l  Serv ice  Regulat ions a l s o  appear t o  be somewhat o f  a  problem f o r  
t he  P . M . ' S  i n  b u i l d i n g  and m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e i r  p r o ~ e c t  eam. As one P.M. sa id :  
I ' v e  g o t  t h r e e  people I cou ld  do comple te ly  w i t h o u t .  
Bu t  i f  I asked f o r  t h e i r  r e l ease  f r om t h i s  p r o j e c t ,  I 
would most l i k e l y  have t o  g i v e  up my t h r e e  bes t  men, so 
I j u s t  s i t  here and d o n ' t  do any th i ng ,  
I n  many ways, t he  Apo l l o  P.M. d o e s n ' t  have t h e  freedom o f  h i s  coun te rpa r t  i n  
i n d u s t r y  as f a r  as b u i l d i n g  and m a i n t a i n i n g  h i s  p r o j e c t  team. 
It a l s o  appears t o  us t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  p r o j e c t  manager i s  one who 
respec ts  the  v iewpo in ts  of h i s  p r o j e c t  i n t e r f a c e s  and y e t  ge ts  them t o  do 
what he wants. One P,M. noted f o r  example: 
You have t o  understand who you ' r e  d e a l i n g  w i t h .  An 
engineer  i n  t h e  l abs  may f e e l  t h a t  we should s e t t l e  
f o r  n o t h i n g  l e s s  than zero leakage on a  c e r t a i n  s e a l .  
He has a  c e r t a i n  background, a  c e r t a i n  psycho log ica l  
makeup t h a t  you have t o  understand, apprec ia te ,  and n o t  
v i o l a t e ,  You can ' t t e l l  a  guy l i ke t h a t ,  go t o  he1 1  , 
you d o n ' t  understand t h e  problem. This  guy can be a  
Ph,D. and can darn w e l l  know e x a c t l y  what h e ' s  t a l k i n g  
about.  So you ' ve  g o t  t o  f i n d  w i t h i n  you r  own means 
t he  mechanisms f o r  communicating w i t h  him,.. and then 
again you ' ve  g o t  t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  h e ' s  communicating 
w i t h  you, . . .  
The l a s t  problem I s h a l l  d iscuss i s  how P.M.'S eva lua te  i n f o r m a t i o n  
f rom those who a re  more t e c h n i c a l  than they  a re .  One approach appeared t o  
be t o  c u l t i v a t e  " t h i r d  p a r t y  i n f o r m a t i o n  sources" .  One P.M. descr ibed h i s  
approach t o  i n f o r m a t i o n  e v a l u a t i o n  as f o l l o w s :  
When a  suppor t  engineer  r e p o r t s  a  recommendation I make 
him defend h i s  p o s i t i o n  .... If he ge ts  p a s t  t h a t  s t e p  
then I have h i s  defend h i s  p o s i t i o n  t o  people o f  s i m i l a r  
t echn i ca l  exper ience,  ,,, 
Implications 
What have we learned about the role of the P.M.? 
1 ,  The effective P.M. knows how to use influence "levers" 
to get compliance from those on whom he depends. 
2. Many researchers say that  the "personality" of the 
project manager i s  the c r i t i ca l  variable in understanding 
the project manager's role .  We have demonstrated that  
there are many other important dimensions to  successfully 
managi ng the p r o ~ e c t  manager's interpersonal relationships. 
3 .  Finally, we think that  our research e f f o r t  has identified 
several useful insights into project management. These 
insights will not only be useful to  project managers b u t  also 
to  those who manage project managers. 
UTILIZATION OF IN-HOUSE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE IN APOLLO PROJECTS 
Bernard D. Wood 
THE PROBLEM 
The s ize ,  complexity, and various constraints of the Apollo Program have 
been discussed. Perhaps the most significant factor in shaping i t s  manage- 
ment scheme was NASA's determination to  maintain and u t i l i z e  i t s  own enormous 
in-house technical capabili ty while being committed a t  the same time to the 
use of the private sector for  producing the major part of i t s  hardware and 
software, Professor Drucker will discuss relationships with contractors. 
What will be considered now i s  the problem of u t i l iz ing  NASA's technical 
resources as effectively as possible in the circumstances. 
The problem was attacked through the adoption of an apparently strong 
program/pro Sect management scheme. Project management had been used before. 
However, i t s  exact forms as found in the Manned Space Flight program i s  
undoubtedly unique, I t  i s  our contention that  the extent of the in-house 
technical competence along with the commitment to depend on outside con- 
t ractors  shaped the project management schemes used. Moreover, the excellence 
of the in-house competence provided both the essential strength and the 
major d i f f icu l ty  in the management of Apollo projects. 
THE STRENGTH 
The strength of project management in Apollo came from the fac t  that  
each project manager, in dealing with a contractor, knew tha t  he was backed 
u p  by an in-house competence that  probably no industrial or DOD manager had 
enjoyed, This competence was not identical a t  MSC and MSFC for  various 
reasons, nor was i t  ut i l ized in the same way. B u t  a t  both centers the 
strength was reinforced by a most unusual circumstance: the Research and 
Development Operations Directorate a t  MSFC and Engineering and Development 
and a1 l the other directorates a t  MSC had essentially the same commitment to  
the goals and the same desire for  success of the Apollo program as did the 
program and p r o ~ e c t  managers. This was true throughout the centers from the 
directors right down to the individual engineers and sc i en t i s t s .  Indeed, 
many engineers and sc ien t i s t s  throughout the two centers be1 ieved that  the 
success of the program would depend much more on themselves than on the 
managers. And they were not only willing b u t  anxious to  take on that  
responsibil i ty.  What more could a manager ask for  and where e l se  in govern- 
ment or industry could he find such support? I do not mean to  imply tha t  no 
one cared w h o  ran the show. B u t  with the acceptance of a c m o n  commitment, 
the trade-offs necessary in center reorganization were more readily accepted. 
THE DIFFICULTY 
A major d i f f icu l ty  in the job of the project manager stemmed from that  
same in-house competence from which he drew his strength. Individuals in 
research, engineering and development had a prfde in the i r  own a b i l i t i e s  tha t  
~ e s u l  ted in jealousies and even resentments against project managers. The 
managers frequently admitted that  they naturally had less  technical competence 
in the narrower areas of applied science than the i r  counterparts in ei ther  the 
NASA Center organizations or the contractor plants,  and yet they necessarily 
had the decision making power. This d i f f icu l ty  went beyond individuals since 
both R and DO a t  Huntsville and E and D a t  Houston had strong, we91 estab- 
lished line-management structures that  fostered dual loyal t ies .  
To maximize the use of the in-house competence, and a t  the same time 
minimize t he  ~ e a l o u s i e s  and c o n f l i c t s  , r e q u i r e d  t h a t  responsi  b i  1 i ty and 
a u t h o r i t y  be i n t e n t i o n a l l y  vague, Pro fessor  Wilemon has d e a l t  w i t h  t h e  
general  problem o f  a u t h o r i t y  a l ready .  I w i l l  add o n l y  t h a t ,  i n  maximiz ing 
in-house suppor t ,  t h e  de lega t i on  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  has meant more than  t he  
de lega t i on  o f  a u t h o r i t y .  It i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  as shown on 
paper cannot be taken t o o  l i t e r a l l y .  
THE TOOLS 
There were t h r e e  t o o l s  t h a t  made p r o ~ e c t  management f e a s i b l e  i n  t h e  A p o l l o  
program. The f i r s t  was t he  es tab l i shment  o f  Change Board l e v e l s  w i t h i n  t h e  
program t h a t  e x a c t l y  para1 l e l  ed management l eve1 s  . (Pro fessor  Pool e r  has 
d e a l t  w i t h  t he  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h i s  i n  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  c o n f l i c t s . )  There 
i s  a  n i c e  analogy here w i t h  coun te r f l ow  towers i n  chemical process i n d u s t r i e s .  
Change reques ts  and proposals  bubbled up through t h e  o rgan i za t i on ,  r e s o l v a b l e  
c o n f l i c t s  be ing  f i l t e r e d  o u t  a t  each l e v e l .  Management dec i s i ons  cascaded 
down through t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o n l y  a f t e r  a  thorough e v a l u a t i o n  a t  t h e  h i g h e s t  
necessary l e v e l ,  so t h a t  d i r e c t i v e s  and requests  were never t o o  f a r  f rom an 
e q u i l i b r i u m  s t a t e ,  
The second t o o l  was m a t r i x  o rgan i za t i on ,  p i n p o i n t i n g  f o r  any sub-system 
the  managers, t e c h n i c a l  suppor t  personnel ,  r e s i d e n t  managers a t  c o n t r a c t o r  
s i t e s  , and c o n t r a c t o r  coun te rpar ts  i n  a  h o r i z o n t a l  s l  i c e  across t h e  v e r t i c a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  o rgan i za t i ons .  Whether t h i s  system i s  consc ious l y  
d i sp layed  on c h a r t s  as i n  t h e  Saturn V Program a t  MSFC o r  i s  e v i d e n t  f rom t h e  
way i n  which tasks  a r e  broken down as i n  ASP0 a t  MSC, i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  as a  
concept i n  such a complex ope ra t i on  o f  u s i n g  bo th  in-house e x p e r t i s e  and 
c o n t r a c t o r s o  
The third tool was the telephone, the symbol of the constant informal 
communication among a l l  elements, without which program and project management 
would have been impossible, 
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MSFC and MSC 
P r o ~ e c t  management i s  not the same a t  the two centers. As Professor Pooler 
has pointed out ,  the differences have the i r  reasons both in the history of 
each center and in the program components for  which each i s  responsible. 
To see the differences, we must look particularly a t  the role of the 
sub-system manager. As a "manager" a t  Marshall, he i s  not in an extremely 
strong position; in fac t  his role may be described as essent ial ly  coordinative 
rather than direct ive,  He i s ,  however, in a less  ambiguous position than i s  
his counterpart a t  Houston. He i s  c lear ly in the Program Management director- 
a t e ,  and i s  c lear ly in one corner of the t r iangle  made u p  of his of f ice ,  
Science and Engineering, and the contractor,  We himself must resolve confl ic ts  
within th i s  t r iangle  or refer the problem upward to  a higher management level .  
Program Management, then, a t  Huntsville has a more d i rec t  l ine through which 
to control contracts,  B u t  i t s  penetration of the working laboratories housing 
the great in-house competence meets the resistance of the l ine  organization of 
that directorate  and the resentment technical experts hold towards clearly 
separate managers, 
MSC, in order to ensure closer identification of the functional director- 
ates with the huge Apollo program and to prevent the Apol lo  porgram off ice from 
engulfing the whole center,  reorganized to  locate i t s  sub-system "managers" 
in the Engineering and Development directorate .  In so doing, they made a 
s ignif icant  digression from conventional project management. This meant tha t  
i t  was necessary t o  have p r o j e c t  o f f i c e r s  i n  t he  Program Cont ro l  D i v i s i o n  o f  
the  Apol l o  Spacecra f t  Program O f f i c e  who would have " s i g n - o f f "  a u t h o r i t y  on 
d i ~ e c t l o n s  t o  c o n t r a c t o r s .  These o f f i c e r s  were t o  team up w i t h  t h e  sub-system 
managers t o  mon i t o r  and d i r e c t  c o n t r a c t o r s ,  A t  t he  same t ime,  t h e  CSM and LM 
P r o ~ e c t  Engineer ing D i v i s i o n s  o f  ASPO, as w e l l  as t h e  CSM and t h e  LM o f f i c e s  
i n  ASPO's Systems Engineer ing D i v i s i o n  had no formal  d i r e c t  l i n e s  t o  t h e  sub- 
system managers on whom they  were dependent, The CSM and t he  LM p r o j e c t  
managers had no d i s t i n c t  o rgan i za t i ons  o f  t h e i r  own w i t h i n  ASPO. It i s  
s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  bo th  major  p r o j e c t  managers a t  Houston expressed r e g r e t  a t  
l o s i n g  d i r e c t  c o n t r o l  over  t h e i r  sub-system managers. 
Awkward and ambiguous as t h i s  scheme may seem, i t  d i d  avo id  a t  l e a s t  some 
o f  t h e  resentment towards p r o j e c t  management t h a t  we found i n  some branches o f  
t he  H u n t s v i l l e  "Labs", and i t  d i d  avo id  t h e  necess i t y  o f  s t e a l i n g  good men f rom 
the  f u n c t i o n a l  d i r e c t o r a t e s ,  
Bu t  has t h e  MSC ve rs i on  o f  p r o j e c t  management avoided t h e  l ong  range danger 
po in ted  o u t  by Pro fessor  Poo le r  who noted t h a t  a  h o s t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  must n o t  be 
dominated by a  p r o j e c t ?  And what would happen i f  t h e r e  were many p r o j e c t s  
r unn ing  concu r ren t l y?  Could we a f f o r d  t o  f ragment Engineer ing and Development 
by making some o f  i t s  people sub-system managers i n  o r d e r  t o  i n s u r e  E and D  
involvement i n  a l l  t h e  p r o j e c t s ?  
We m igh t  wonder t oo  about t he  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  MSFC model i n  d i f f e r e n t  
c i rcumstances. Wi th  many programs, cou ld  t h e  d i r e c t o r  o f  Program Management 
s t i l l  a c t  as manager o f  each program a t  t h a t  cen te r?  Would c o n f l i c t  between 
cen te r  and program l o y a l t y  s t i  9 1 be reso l vab le?  
We must conclude f rom our  s tudy  o f  t he  A p o l l o  program a t  MSC and a t  MSFC 
our  l e s s  d e t a i l e d  s tudy  o f  KSC t h a t  no one model o f  program management can be 
described as best  f o r  t he  purpose of op t im iz ing  the  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  in-house 
exper t i se .  
THE SUCCESS 
What about the  obvious success o f  the  d i f f e r e n t  management schemes found 
i n  the  Apo l lo  program? C e r t a i n l y  complex management schemes were necessary 
and were achieved, b u t  why the  to le rance f o r  c o n f l i c t  and ambiguous a u t h o r i t y ?  
Given the  in-house and con t rac to r  competence and n o t i n g  the  na t i ona l  commi t- 
ment t o  a moqn land ing  i n  the decade, on what d i d  success depend? 
My conclus ion i s  t h a t  i t  depended more than anyth ing e l s e  on the  dedica- 
t i o n  o f  the i n d i v i d u a l s  throughout the  centers and on t h e i r  unreserved 
personal commitment t o  the c l e a r l y  de f ined goals o f  the  Apo l lo  program, There 
were very  r e a l  c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  b u t  they were reso lved because a l l  
d i r e c t o r a t e s  and i n d i v i d u a l s  recognized t h a t  cooperat ion was c r u c i a l  t o  t he  
success o f  the program. 
THE PROJECT MANAGER - CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIP 
Eugene E. Drucker 
The l e g a l  na tu re  o f  t he  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t he  NASA p r o j e c t  managers 
and t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  c o n t r a c t o r s  i s  w e l l  de f i ned  by t he  terms o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t .  
However, t he  a c t u a l  na tu re  v a r i e s  w i d e l y  i n  t h e  A p o l l o  program, go ing  w e l l  
beyond t h e  c o n t r a c t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  i n  terms o f  f requency o f  con tac t ,  i n f o rm-  
a l  i ty  and mutual  a i d ,  
There a re  severa l  reasons f o r  which v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t he  r e l a t i o n s h i p  e x i s t  
w i t h  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t r a c t o r s .  
F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  change w i t h  t ime,  as work goes through conceptual  
design, manufactur ing and t e s t i n g  phases. I n  t h e  beginn ing,  t h e  i n t e r f a c e  
i s  concerned w i t h  p r i m a r i l y  t e c h n i c a l  ma t te r s ,  Bu t  l a t e r  on, schedules, 
i n s p e c t i o n  and check-out procedures, and tasks  o f  t h i s  na tu re  become prominent  
mat te rs  o f  concern. 
Secondly, each c o n t r a c t o r s '  m i ss i on  i s  unique, t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  
v a r i e s  w ide l y ,  and t h e  s a f e t y  and r e l i a b i l i t y  requi rements o f  t he  p roduc t  
d i f f e r .  
T h i r d l y  , t h e  Centers w i t h  whom t h e  c o n t r a c t o r s  i n t e r f a c e  manage d i f f e r -  
e n t l y ,  f o r  reasons which my co l leagues have discussed. 
F i n a l l y ,  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  s k i l l s  p l a y  an impo r tan t  p a r t  i n  every  human 
r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  I t  i s  n o t  t h e  case, we f e e l ,  t h a t  formal  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  pa t -  
t e r n s  and behav io r  norms a re  s e t  up f o r  - a l l  t h e  p r o j e c t  manager-contractor 
i n t e r f a c e s .  Ins tead ,  t he  i n d i v i d u a l s  e s t a b l i s h  methods o f  d e a l i n g  w i t h  each 
o the r ,  depending on t h e i r  p e r s o n a l i t i e s .  Subsequently, t h e  e f f e c t i v e  ways 
of do ing  business may o r  may n o t  be l e g i t i m i z e d  by a  formal  s t r u c t u r e .  
There are a few general points to be made about the contractor organi- 
zations. 
The contractor 's  or the NASA program managers in general do not have 
single counterparts in the other organization, although both have t r ied  t o  
bring th i s  about. Counterpart personnel makes obvious points of contact 
and promotes ease of communication and the pinpointing of responsibil i ty,  
In real i  ty , there i s  considerable over1 ap, rather than a clear cu t ,  one- 
to-one matching of responsi bi 1 i  t i e s .  One NASA project manager interviewed 
interfaced equally with a contractor 's  program manager, his deputy manager 
and his chief engineer. 
The contractors ' program off ices are general ly strong--more so than 
NASA project off ices ,  The greater freedom that industry enjoys to s h i f t  and 
reward employees i s  certainly an important reason for  t h i s .  
The authority and importance of a project in a Company depends on the 
s ize of the contract.  One finds a spectrum from a practically autonomous 
division to  a relat ively small project off ice operating in a matrix type 
organization. 
The contractors '  projects have a l i f e  span and undergo a metamorphosis 
from the conceptual phase, t o  a small program in a matrix to a large program 
and perhaps to a company division or a new company, and final ly ,  often 
through a consolidation phase back to  a matrix element. 
While NASA project offices change also,  they do not do  so as rapidly or 
as dras t ica l ly .  
A significant difference between contract negotiations a t  Houston and 
Huntsville became apparent to us, A t  the l a t t e r  center,  the procedure i s  
somewhat formal because of the separation of engineering and contract1 ng . 
Negotiations are therefore lengthier and more cumbersome than a t  Houston. 
There, negotiations are  less  formal because there i s  better 1 iaison between 
technical and contracts people. The contracts people participate in the 
earl i e s t  stages of negotiations. The method i s  preferred by contractors. 
One contractor with experience with both centers remarked that  he preferred 
to negotiate contracts with Houston b u t  be monitored by Huntsville. 
The resident NASA organizations play a very important and u t i l i t a r i an  
part in the operation of the Apollo program, b u t  they do d i f f e r  in several 
ways a t  the two major centers,  
The RASPO's out of Houston report to  the Program Manager a t  MSC. They 
carry more authority,  make more decisions on s i t e  and seem somewhat more 
effect ive than the i r  Huntsville counterparts. The RMO's report to  the stage 
managers a t  MSFC, seem to have less  authority by reason of having to  clear 
decisions with the MSFC Labs. By the same token the RMO's interaction with 
the contractors i s  less  than the RASPO's and i t  i s  for  th is  reason that  the 
contractors prefer the RMO type of monitoring. A t  KSC, the Houston residents 
appear to  carry more authority than the Huntsville resident personnel, who ac t  
simply as l iaison persons. One contractor remarked tha t  while decisions were 
formulated more rapidly a t  Houston, they were more thoroughly considered a t  
Huntsvi 11 e .  
In the case of the resident off ices ,  a one to  one counterpart relation- 
ship i s  establ ished a t  lower level s of organization between contractor manage- 
ment and NASA residents,  
The resident off ice tends to  become in part the contractor 's  a l ly .  A t  
the same time, i f  he i s  n o t  careful,  the resident manager may alienate his 
own program or stage manager. One of the important roles of the resident 
manager i s  to foster  the development of mutual respect between the contractor 
and NASA as a whole. 
I t  i s  inevitable that  some problems should ex is t  between NASA and i t s  
contractors, These problems have been described by contractor personnel as 
follows: 
1. There i s  excessive monitoring and penetration into Company a f fa i r s .  
Contractors get what i s  known as a "goldfish bowl" complex. 
2. NASA resident off ices  appear to  be overmanned, especially in the 
l a t t e r  stages of a program, The Civil Service system retards the trimming of 
the NASA work force. 
3,  From the contractors '  point of view, there are excessive requests 
by NASA for  information , briefings , proposals , etc .  These communications, 
however, are required by the stringent configuration management practised a t  
the end of the project. 
4 ,  There i s  some ambiguity in NASA management compared to  contractors '  
stronger l ines of authority,  There i s  considerable overlap between H Q ,  
Center program and project. There are general ly no chief engineers designated 
as such by NASA on the i r  projects,  
5 .  Contractors sometimes get caught in inter-  or intra-Center disputes. 
6 ,  There are 3rd party qua1 i  ty Control people, such as Air Force or 
Navy, on the floor in some plants which sometimes becomes awkward. 
7'. There i s  a tendency for NASA project managers to  become more 
involved in technical de ta i l s  than the contractors' managers. This i s  partly 
because there i s  no chief engineer on the NASA p r o ~ e c t  teams which in turn i s  
a r e su l t  of the fac t  that  NASA i s  essentially a buyer of services. The 
c o n l ~ a c t o ~ s  are essent ial ly  manufactu~ers. 
F i n a l l y ,  some comparisons may be drawn between NASA and Con t rac to r  
p r o j e c t  management, 
1 .  The c o n t r a c t o r  i s  mot i va ted  by t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  p r o f i t ,  o r  f o r  a c q u i s i -  
t f o n  o f  an exper ience base f o r  f u t u r e  work. Th is ,  i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  appears t o  
be t h e  main mechanism o f  technology t r a n s f e r ,  NASA i s  n o t  money o r i e n t e d .  
2. The c o n t r a c t o r s  problems i n v o l v e  manufactur ing,  l a b o r ,  unions, e t c .  , 
whi 1 e  NASA has t o  worry  about schedul i ng , supplementary fund ing  , and c o n t r o l  - 
l i n g  changes, Thus t h e  r o l e s  d ive rge .  
3. Cont rac to rs  ' p r o j e c t  o rgan i za t i ons  a r e  s t r ong  and pyramidal  , hav ing  
more power over  people than  t h e  C i v i l  Se rv i ce  system pe rm i t s  o f  NASA. 
4 Cont rac to rs  a1 ways u t i  1  i z e  c h i e f  engineers.  Both NASA and c o n t r a c t o r  
p r o ~ e c t  managers f e l t  t h a t  such a  p o s i t i o n  would have been u s e f u l  t o  NASA 
p r o j e c t  managers as w e l l .  
5 ,  Con t rac to r  program managers de lega te  more a u t h o r i t y  than  does NASA. 
6 ,  The pr ime c o n t r a c t o r  dea ls  w i t h  i t s  subcon t rac to r  much 1  i ke NASA 
dea ls  w i t h  t he  pr imes. He i s  sub jec t  t o  pressure Prom above and a n x i e t y  f r om 
be1 ow, 
I hope I have shown t h a t  t h e  s t y l e  o f  p r o j e c t  management i n  NASA i s  
d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  i n  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  f i r m s ,  As w e l l ,  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between NASA p r o j e c t  manager and c o n t r a c t o r  i s  dec ided l y  d i f f e r e n t  a t  MSC 
and MSFC. Since p r o ~ e c t s  were managed success fu l  l y  a t  bo th  cen te rs ,  i t  would 
be d i f f i c u l t  indeed t o  s t a t e  t h a t  one system was s u p e r i o r  t o  t he  o the r .  The 
v a r i a t i o n s  may we1 1  have been necessary, cons ide r i ng  t h e  backgrounds and 
miss ions o f  t h e  two cen te rs ,  
CONCLUSION 
These summaries represent  a  s e t  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  observat ions and con- 
c lus ions .  Our f i n a l  r e p o r t  w i l l  expand and i n t e g r a t e  the  summaries. We 
Peel c e r t a i n  t h a t  these i n s i g h t s  can be use fu l  t o  NASA. We a l so  f e e l  
t h a t ,  as a  seasoned i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  team, we can be o f  a d d i t i o n a l  u t i l i t y  
t o  NASA i n  examining o ther  programs, 
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